Olivier Roy
In Tunisia and Egypt took to the streets a new generation. Which is better educated, secular and individualistic than the last.
The popular revolts in North Africa and the Middle East have been interpreted by the Europeans through an outline thirty years old: the Islamic revolution in Iran.
It is expected that the Islamist groups from taking control of the protests or are there to plot in the shadows, ready to seize power. The restraint and pragmatism of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, however, it is surprising and worrying: what happened to the Islamists?
better look at the protesters, it is clear that we are dealing with a generation postislamista. For the people involved in the protests the great revolutionary movements of the seventies and eighties belong to another story, that of their parents. The new generation is not interested ideology: shouting slogans pragmatic and concrete ( erhal , by now) and avoid references to Islam, is what happens in Algeria in the late eighties. Reject the dictatorship, and calls loudly for democracy.
This does not mean that the protesters are lay people, but just do not see in Islam a political ideology can create a better order. The same applies to other ideologies: the protesters are nationalists (witness the large number of flags), but do not exalt nationalism. And even more amazing, they have abandoned any conspiracy theory: the United States and Israel (and France, as regards Tunisia) are no longer considered the cause of the ills of the Arab world. The pan-Arabism seems to have disappeared from the slogan, even if the emulation has pushed Egyptians and Yemenis in the streets after the riots in Tunisia shows that the so-called Arab world is a political reality.
Generation X We are dealing with a generation pluralistic, partly because people are more individualistic. They are more educated than the parents, living in nuclear families, have fewer children, can not find work or have worsened their social conditions. They are more informed and often have access to modern means of communication that allow them to enter in contatto con altri individui senza dover passare attraverso i partiti politici.
I giovani sanno che i regimi islamisti si sono trasformati in dittature e non subiscono il fascino dell’Iran né dell’Arabia Saudita. Quelli che sono scesi in piazza in Egitto sono gli stessi che manifestano in Iran contro Ahmadinejad (per ragioni di propaganda, il regime di Teheran ha detto di sostenere la rivolta egiziana, ma in realtà si è trattato di un regolamento di conti con Hosni Mubarak). Probabilmente sono credenti, ma questo non ha niente a che vedere con le loro rivendicazioni politiche: in questo senso, il loro è un movimento laico, che separa la religione dalla politica.
evident in the name of dignity and "respect", taking up a slogan was born in Algeria in the late nineties. They appeal to universal values, and want a democracy that has nothing to do with that promoted by the Bush administration to justify the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Ironically, were the weakening of the United States in the Middle East and the pragmatism of the Obama administration to support the legitimate expression of a native application for democracy.
However, a revolt is not enough to make the revolution. Consistent with its nature, the people's movement has not leaders or structure or political parties, and this poses the problem of the institutionalization of democracy. It is unlikely that the collapse of a dictatorship to be born soon face a liberal democracy, as Washington hoped to do in Iraq. In many Arab countries, apart from the Islamists and the unions, the framework of organized political forces is rather poor.
What happened then the Islamists, who see in Islam an ideology can solve all the problems of society? Have not disappeared, but have changed. The most radical have left their countries to join the international jihad: they are found in the desert, in the ranks of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Pakistan or the suburbs of London. They have no social or political basis for the global jihad has no connection with social movements and national struggle. Al Qaeda recruits mainly young people without roots, which have truncated their family and neighborhood relations. Faithful to a logic that privileges the "propaganda of the deed", he never bothered to build a political structure in Muslim countries and its impact on Arab societies is zero.
The religious market is wrong, therefore, to relate the Islamic revival in the last thirty years through a process of radicalization policy. If Arab societies today seem to respect the Koran more than they did thirty years ago, how can we explain the absence of Islamic slogans in demonstrations this week? Paradoxically, the re-Islamization social and cultural (the use of the veil, the multiplication of mosques, the proliferation of the preachers, the spread of religious television) has come to de-politicize Islam. You have created a kind of "religious market" that nobody has a monopoly, in line with the new trend of young people to seek personal religious journey.
Dictatorships (except that of Tunisia) have often supported a conservative Islam, very visible but not very politicized, obsessed with control of behavior. The conservatism was found a perfect match in the Salafi current, which focuses on the re-Islamization of individuals and not on social movements. The religious symbols have been stripped of any political value. Everything has become Islamic, from fast food to women's fashion, and when everything is religious, nothing really.
Religious practice has become subjective: everyone builds their faith, following preachers who speak of self-realization, as the Egyptian Amr Khaled. The utopia of the Islamic state no longer of interest to anyone.
But it would be a mistake to believe that even dictators to defend the secular societies by religious fanaticism. Authoritarian regimes have wholly secularized their countries. Indeed, many have allowed a kind of neo-fundamentalist re-Islamization, which preaches the application of Sharia law but failing to reflect on the nature of the state. In many countries, Islamic institutions have been domesticated by the governments and have come to fall back on an austere theological conservatism. Even the traditional religious leaders, Al Azhar University formed, they have nothing more to say on political issues or social ones. They have nothing to offer the new generations, who wish to live their faith more openly.
This trend also applies to political movements like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Tunisia in the party Ennahda. The new generation of militants has learned the lesson: to take power by a revolution can only lead to civil war or dictatorship. Moreover, the experience of repression has approached the Islamists to other political forces. Furthermore, the model turkish taught him something: Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Party for Justice and Development Party (AKP) have been able to reconcile democracy, electoral victory, economic development, independence and advance the values, but perhaps not strictly Islamic perceived as authentic.
More importantly, the Muslim Brotherhood are not the supporters of an alternative social or economic model. They have become conservative in terms of costumes, but liberal in economics. This is undoubtedly the most obvious trends: the Islamists in the eighties, in defense of the oppressed classes, asking such statist economy and an appropriate redistribution of wealth. Today, support the agricultural counter-sponsored by Mubarak, thanks to which the landowners have the right to again raise the rents and send away renters. Consequently, social movements Egyptians you see a return of the Left, in particular trade unions.
The bourgeois of the Islamists is a point in favor of democracy, this situation predisposes them to reconciliation, compromise and alliance with other political forces. Today the Islamists entered the democratic game. Sure, they want to play a role in the control of customs, but if they do not want to rely on an apparatus of repression such as Iran, will have to adapt to a question of freedom is not limited to the right to elect a parliament.
In the democratic game The Muslim Brotherhood will be a keystone in the change because the generation took to the streets does not have a political structure. In addition, Arab societies are rather conservative: the middle classes have grown thanks to economic liberalization, political stability and they want to protest mainly against the predatory nature of dictatorships like that of Tunisia, which has encroached on kleptomania. The comparison between Tunisia and Egypt clarifies many points. In Tunisia, Ben Ali had weakened the clan all his potential opponents, refusing to share not only power but also wealth.
In Egypt, the regime had a broader social base, the army was not limited to the exercise of power but also participates in the management of the economy. The demand for democracy will therefore have to deal with patronage networks created by various schemes. The democratic aspirations will be able to overcome the complex networks of alliances and membership in groups like the army or tribe? Authoritarian regimes will be able to mobilize their traditional allies (the Bedouin in Jordan, the tribes in Yemen)? These groups will be able to do their democratic aspirations?
The process will be long and chaotic, but one thing is certain: we have more to do with the Arab-Muslim exceptionalism. Recent events reflect a profound change in Arab societies, which began long ago. The events in Tunisia and Egypt show that the players have learned the lessons of their history. This does not mean that we have done to deal with Islam or that liberal democracy is the "end of history." But we must now think of Islam in relation to a culture that arabomusulmana, today as yesterday, is by no means closed in on itself.
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